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Macroeconomic Surveillance Within the EU 
By Marek Dabrowski
 
The  new  European  Union  (EU)  economic  governance 
package  released  by  the  European  Commission  on 
September 29, 2010 includes two major components, i.e., 
changes and amendments to the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) and new regulation on the prevention and correction 
of macroeconomic imbalances within the EU and European 
Monetary Union (EMU). While the first piece offers a certain 
improvement in the EU fiscal surveillance rules the second 
one looks deeply flawed and operationally unenforceable
1.  
Importance of EU-wide Fiscal Discipline 
The  fiscal  crisis  in  Greece  as  well  as  other  European 
economies confirmed the importance of fiscal discipline at 
both  EU/EMU  and  national  levels.  It  is  difficult  to 
overestimate the potential damage caused by the sovereign 
insolvency of any EU member state (regardless of whether 
this concerns EMU or non-EMU member countries) to the 
entire  Union,  other  member  states,  or  the  entire  global 
economy.  The  contagion  channels  may  involve  financial 
market  panics,  high  exposure  to  public  debt  instruments 
(commercial  banks  and  other  financial  institutions),  and 
exchange rate volatility (among non-Euro zone countries).  
Hence,  a  strong  surveillance  regime  which  could  ensure 
fiscal  discipline  in  EU  member  states  and  prevent  their 
insolvency should be considered an important European (or 
even  global)  public  policy  goal.  This  regime  should  apply 
equally  to  Euro  area  and  non-members  because  negative 
spillovers can originate from both groups of countries and 
may affect the entire EU, not only the Euro zone.  
The component of the Commission’s legislative package that 
intends  to  reinforce  SGP  (substantially  diluted  in  2005) 
appears to head in the right direction although one should 
not overestimate the scale and potential positive impact of 
the proposed changes. Instead of a radical overhaul, they 
offer  a     marginal  improvement  to  the  existing  surveillance 
regime.  
                                                             
1 This E-Brief contains a modified version of the author’s opinion on the EU 
Economic Governance Package prepared on request of the EU Economic and 
Financial Affairs and International Trade Sub-Committee (Sub-Committee A) of 
the UK House of Lords. 
EU Fiscal Rules: Preventive Measures 
    The so-called preventive arm of SGP, based on Article 
121 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), is to be amended with the expenditure rule. The 
essence  of  this  rule  is  to  limit  the  annual  rate  of 
expenditure growth to “…a prudent medium-term rate 
of  growth  of GDP” (below  this  rate  a  country  fails  to 
comply  with  the  medium  term  target  of  a  close-to-
balance fiscal position) unless the excess of expenditure 
growth  is  matched  by  discretionary  measures  on  the 
revenue side. This rule attempts to curb excessive public 
spending,  but  it  is  not  particularly  demanding  if  one 
takes into consideration that the majority of EU member 
states face rapidly growing debt-to-GDP ratios.  
 
    Moreover, determining ex-ante a prudent medium-term 
rate of growth of GDP of any individual country in the 
current global macroeconomic environment as well as 
having  limited  knowledge  of  the  supply-side  damage 
caused  by  the  recent  global  financial  crisis  appears 
almost impossible. In addition, it will become a subject 
of  future  political  bargaining  between  respective  EU 
member state governments and the Commission (similar 
difficulties have been experienced when determining a 
cyclically adjusted medium term fiscal position for the 
current SGP).  
On September 7, 2010, the EU Economic and Financial 
Affairs  Council  (ECOFIN)  introduced  the  European 
Semester,  which  brought  together  the  coordination 
processes  of  both  the  SGP  and  the  Broad  Economic 
Guidelines under a single institutional framework. This 
initiative may help in strengthening ex-ante peer review 
mechanisms  at  the  early  stages  of  national  budget 
planning.  
EU Fiscal Rules: Corrective Measures 
Under the so-called corrective arm of the SGP (based on 
Article 126 of TFEU) the Commission proposes putting 
debt  criterion  on  equal  footing  with  the  deficit. 
However, operationalization of this criterion in respect  
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to  corrective  actions  raises  some  doubts.  Countries  which 
record debt levels above 60% of GDP should demonstrate an 
ability to converge towards this level with an annual rate of 
at least one-twentieth of the difference over the previous 
three  years.  Taking  into  consideration  the  strongly  pro-
cyclical character of debt-to-GDP ratios (as demonstrated by 
the  recent  crisis)  this  may  be  too  simple  and  insufficient 
during boom times and too difficult (if not impossible) during 
recessions.  
The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) will be strengthened 
by  the  introduction  of  additional  and  more  automatic 
financial  sanctions  against  non-complying  countries.  They 
will  begin  working  immediately  upon  launching  the  EDP 
(non-interest-bearing deposit equal to 0.2% of GDP) and will 
be  stepped  up  in  case  of  non-compliance  with  initial 
recommendations. The mechanism of “reverse voting” gives 
an opportunity to decrease political discretion in imposing 
sanctions, but it will not eliminate it completely. In the past 
this discretion made it impossible to impose any financial 
sanctions  against  non-complying  member  states,  and 
generally,  favored  large  countries  against  small  ones.  The 
most  important  shortcoming  of  both  the  existing  and 
proposed financial sanction mechanisms is its limitation to 
Euro area countries while the contagion effects generated by 
sovereign  insolvency  in  any  non-Euro  area  member  state 
(especially a large one) can be equally damaging.  
National Fiscal Rules and Crisis Resolution 
The draft Council Directive on requirements for budgetary 
frameworks  of  the  Member  States,  addresses  a  set  of 
important  issues  intended  to  increase  the  level  of  fiscal 
transparency  and  predictability  at  the  national  level, 
increase  quality  and  reliability  of  fiscal  forecasting  and 
planning,  extend  its  time  horizon  to  at  least  three  years, 
ensure  the  coverage  of  all  subsectors  within  general 
governments, set national numerical fiscal rules (compatible 
with the Treaty and SGP provisions) and set up independent 
budgetary offices or fiscal policy councils to provide external 
assessments  of  the  medium-to-long-term  fiscal 
consequences of government and parliamentary decisions. 
This  is  an  important  piece  of  legislation  addressing 
institutional and methodological challenges related to fiscal 
discipline at the appropriate (i.e. national) level, where most 
fiscal decisions are actually taken. It can limit, to a certain 
extent, a risk of fiscal free riding in individual member states. 
However,  this  gives  national  authorities  considerable 
discretionary  opportunities  to  decide  how  effectively  this 
directive  will  be  embodied  into  national  legislations  and 
consequently how these legislations will be enforced.  
In addition, the decision of the European Council of October 
28-29, 2010 to initate a limited revision of Part Three, Title 
VII  of  TFEU  (“Economic  and  Monetary  Policy”)  provides  a 
chance to build a permanent crisis resolution mechanism, 
after the current temporary solutions launched in May 
2010  expire  in  2013.  A  permanent  mechanism  could 
help  to  minimize  market  panics  in  case  of  fiscal 
difficulties  in  individual  countries  and  would  force 
financial  markets  to  improve  pricing  of  actual  fiscal 
insolvency risks in advance.  
Fighting Macroeconomic Imbalances 
Apart  from  strengthening  fiscal  surveillance  and  fiscal 
discipline mechanisms at the EU-wide and national level, 
the  Commission  proposes  the  introduction  of  a 
completely new mechanism which prevents and corrects 
macroeconomic imbalances. They are elaborated in two 
draft  regulations  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council:  (1)  on  the  prevention  and  correction  of 
macroeconomic imbalances (which shall apply to all EU 
member  states)  and  (2)  on  enforcement  measures  to 
correct  excessive  macroeconomic  imbalances  in  the 
Euro area (which will apply only to EMU members). In 
case  of  “excessive  imbalances”,  the  Commission 
proposes to launch Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP), 
which is similar to EDP, but backed by financial sanctions 
in respect to Euro area countries.  
Unlike the prospect of fiscal surveillance/discipline rules, 
the  conceptual  background  of  this  legislation  is  very 
controversial if not completely wrong. First, the meaning 
of  macroeconomic  imbalance  is  not  clearly  defined  in 
the  draft  legislation.  Based  on  the  Commission’s 
comments  and  overall  context  of  the  proposed 
measures one can find a current account imbalance as 
the  operational  equivalent  of  macroeconomic 
imbalance.  However,  this  means  that  the  Commission 
intends to control the variable, which is, in a world of 
free  capital  movement,  well  beyond  direct  policy 
influence, especially within a single currency area (see 
Figure 1).  
Furthermore,  this  approach  seems  to  reflect  a 
traditional  balance-of-payment  analytical  framework 
with  an  implicit  assumption  of  a  fixed  residence  of 
capital  owners,  home  country  bias  in  capital 
movements, as well as a necessity to balance a country’s 
net international investment position over a medium-to-
long  term  horizon
2.  Such  a  conceptual  approach  is 
incompatible  with  the  realities  of  a  highly  integrated 
monetary union such as the EMU. Moreover, if taken 
seriously it means stopping or limiting capital flows from 
higher-income countries and regions to less developed 
ones.  
                                                             
2 These implicit assumptions have been challenged in M. Dabrowski 
“Rethinking balance-of-payments constraints in a globalized Word”, CASE 
Network Studies and Analyses, No. 330 (2006), http://www.case-
research.eu/upload/publikacja_plik/11517190_sa330.pdf   
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FIGURE 1:  CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES WITHIN THE EURO AREA, IN % OF GDP 
         
SOURCE: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010 
If  “excessive”  current  account  imbalances  pose  any  real 
threat to EU-wide macroeconomic stability or the common 
market,  it  will  most  likely  come  from  those  countries 
remaining outside the Euro area rather than EMU members 
(such as excessive volatility of national currencies against the 
Euro). Ironically, under the proposed regulations non-Euro 
area  members  will  be  subject  to  a  reduced  level  of 
monitoring and will avoid the threat of financial sanctions. 
Finally,  when  one  considers  the  available  national  policy 
options  to  correct  this  “excessive  imbalance”  the  only 
obvious solution is the control of capital movements. The 
problem  with  this  policy  option  is  that  it  comes  in  direct 
violation  of  the  Treaty  as  well  as  with  one  of  the  basic 
principles of the single market.  
On an operational level, the proposed regulations not only 
fail to define macroeconomic imbalances but also the exact 
numeric  criteria  of  “excessive  imbalances”,  the  speed  of 
required adjustment, adjustment measures, etc. They give 
the  Commission  a  mandate  to  establish  “…an  indicative 
scorecard  as  a  tool  to  facilitate  early  identification  and 
monitoring  of  imbalances”.  Most  elements  of  the  EIP 
leave  great  room  for  discretionary  decisions  and, 
therefore,  for  political  bargaining.  One  can  hardly 
believe  that  such  a  vaguely  defined  and  highly 
discretionary framework can work effectively. 
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